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Pfister v. Shusta,
657 N.E.2D 1013 (ILL. 1995).
INTRODUCION
Sean Pfister ("Pfister"), a college student, sued another student Terry Shusta
("Shusta") for negligence due to injuries he sustained in an informal can kicking
game conducted in the lobby of a college dormitory. The Illinois Circuit Court of
McLean County granted summary judgment for Shusta. Pfister appealed, and on
review, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed the circuit
court's order in favor of Shusta. The Supreme Court of Illinois held: (1) under
the contact sports exception, participants in contact sports are not liable for inju-
ries caused by ordinary negligence, and (2) because the can kicking game was a
contact sport, Shusta could not be held liable for injuries caused by the simple
negligence alleged in Pfister's complaint.
FACTS
Plaintiff Sean Pfister and defendant Terry Shusta were college students at
Illinois State University. While waiting in a dormitory lobby for friends, Pfister,
Shusta and two other students spontaneously began kicking a crushed aluminum
soda can. The four students divided into two teams, with two persons on each
team, and set up informal goals against the walls of the dormitory lobby. Each
team attempted to kick the crushed can into the opposing team's goal. Pfister
allegedly pushed Shusta toward a wall in an attempt to gain control of the can.
Shusta responded by allegedly pushing Pfister, causing Pfister to fall. While
attempting to break his fall, Pfister put his left hand and forearm through the
glass door of a fire extinguisher case on the wall of the dormitory. Pfister sus-
tained injuries to his left hand and forearm.
Pfister brought suit against Shusta claiming that his injuries were caused by
Shusta's negligence. In response, Shusta filed a motion for summary judgment
contending that the activity at issue constituted a contact sport, and therefore, he
could not be held liable for injuries caused by simple negligent conduct. The
circuit court granted Shusta's motion for summary judgment, finding that the
activity at issue fell within the contact sports exception to liability based on the
standard of ordinary care applicable to negligence cases. Pfister appealed the
summary judgment order, and the appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court
of Illinois allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The main issue before the court was whether the contact sports exception to
liability premised on negligence was applicable, therefore barring recovery for
simple negligence. The court first analyzed the evolution of the contact sports
exception. The court recognized that generally, a person owes a duty of care to
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guard against injuries to others that may result as a reasonably probable and
foreseeable consequence of negligent conduct.' However, the court then noted
that the contact sports exception is a judicially created exception which holds
that voluntary participants in contact sports are not liable for injuries caused by
simple negligent conduct; however, they owe each other a duty to refrain from
willful and wanton, or intentional, misconduct and are liable for injuries caused
by willful and wanton misconduct.2
The appellate court created the contact sports exception in Nabozny v.
Barnhill.3 In Nabozny, the court held that a participant would be liable for inju-
ries caused during a sports game if the participant's conduct was "either deliber-
ate, wil[1]ful or with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other player...
,,4 The court further noted that since Nabozny, Illinois appellate courts have
applied the willful and wanton standard to cases in which participants in both
formal and informal sporting activities were injured as a result of the conduct of
their co-participants.5
The court next addressed the definition of willful and wanton conduct. The
court stated that this conduct is defined as a "course of action which shows
actual or deliberate intent to harm or which, if the course of action is not inten-
tional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for a person's own
safety or the safety or property of others." Further, willful and wanton conduct
is "a hybrid between acts considered negligent and behavior found to be inten-
tionally tortious."7
The supreme court then addressed the standard applied by the appellate court
in the case at bar. The appellate court abandoned the willful and wanton standard
and instead applied the following five-part factual inquiry: (1) was the activity at
issue a game; (2) was it played in an appropriate area; (3) did the game have
rules or usages; (4) did the rules or usages permit the bodily contact which oc-
curred; and (5) did the injury to the plaintiff arise from the contact which was
permitted by the rules.' The supreme court noted that the appellate court's ap-
proach was based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as well as upon dicta in
a Supreme Court of Illinois decision, Osborne v. Sprowls.9 The court here noted
that under this characterization, a contact sport and the concurrent determination
of whether the conduct that caused injury was willful and wanton are irrelevant.
Ultimately, the supreme court declined to adopt the approach of the appellate
court. The court stated that due to the spontaneous and disorganized nature of the
1. Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 562 N.E.2d 967, 968 (111. 990).
2. Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (II. 1995).
3. 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
4. Id. at 261.
5. Pfister, 657 N.E.2d at 1015-16.
6. Id. at 1016.
7. Id. (quoting Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402, 406 (111. 1994)).
8. Il (citing Pfister v. Shusta, 627 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (111. App. Ct. 1994)).
9. 419 N.E.2d 913, 918 (111. 1981) ("Clearly, it may be negligent to play in areas inappropriate
for such activity.").
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kicking game, it did not appear that rules were formulated governing the permis-
sible physical contact among participants in this case. Such a lack of rules made
the appellate court's approach unworkable in this context. Further, the court
noted that even in those cases where rules govern the permissible degree of
physical contact among the participants of a game, it is difficult to determine
what may be an acceptable amount of physical contact allowed by the rules.
Rule infractions are almost inevitable in games where physical contact is inher-
ent, and this justifies a different standard of care. The court also justified its
rejection of the appellate court's approach by noting that "the contact sports
exception to liability based on failure to exercise ordinary care offers a practical
approach that is also supported by common sense."'" The relevant inquiry
should be "whether the participants were involved in a contact sport, not whether
the sport was formally organized or coached.""
The court then applied the contact sports exception to the facts. The court
noted that, in the instant case, the participants engaged in informal action equiv-
alent to soccer or floor hockey. Participants of such sports where physical con-
tact is "virtually inevitable[] assume greater risks of injury than nonparticipants
or participants in noncontact sports."' 2 Hence, the court held that, "[riecovery
will be granted for injuries sustained by participants in contact sports only if the
injuries are caused by wil[l]ful and wanton or intentional misconduct of co-par-
ticipants."'3 In the instant case, Pfister did not allege willful or wanton, or in-
tentional, misconduct. Therefore, the supreme court concluded that the circuit
court properly applied the contact sports exception bar to liability for injuries
caused by the simple negligence alleged in the plaintiffs complaint.
Lastly, the court addressed Pfister's argument for the adoption of the duty of
ordinary care for participants in contact sports. Pfister contended that such an
approach is supported by Illinois public policy. The policy is one of refusing "to
immunize negligent conduct in order to promote socially beneficial policies such
as the promotion of participation in athletic events."' 4 However, the court reject-
ed this approach. The court held that the contact sports exception "strikes the
appropriate balance between society's interest in limiting liability for injuries
resulting from physical contact inherent in a contact sport and society's interest
in allowing recovery for injuries resulting from wil[1]ful and wanton or inten-
tional misconduct by participants."' 5 The court noted that the contact sports
exception takes into account the voluntary nature of participation in games where
physical contact is anticipated and where risk of injury caused by this contact is
inherent. Therefore, the court rejected Pfister's alternative argument that Illinois
public policy supports the adoption of the duty of ordinary care for participants
10. Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Il. 1995).
11. Id. (citing Keller v. Mols, 509 N.E.2d 584 (111. App. Ct. 1987)).
12. Id. (citing Oswald v. Township High School District No. 214, 406 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980)).
13. Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. 1995).
14. Id. at 1018.
15. Id.
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in contact sports.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the judgment of the appellate court
and affirmed the grant of summary judgment of the circuit court, holding that
Pfister failed to state a viable cause of action because he failed to allege willful
and wanton, or intentional, misconduct by Shusta. The court reasoned that the
can kicking game at issue fell under the contact sports exception, which relieves
participants in contact sports from liability based on ordinary negligence. Further,
the court rejected Pfister's argument that Illinois public policy supports the adop-
tion of the duty of ordinary care for participants in contact sports.
Terry Schiff
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